As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616-617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). In my view there is no justification for the. Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. 430 U. S., at 165. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. But we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. Thus. 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. Although the Court concluded that the redistricting scheme at issue in Beer was nonretrogressive, it did not hold that the plan, for that reason, was immune from constitutional challenge. See ante, at 642, 649, 652, 657-658. Shaw v. Reno is an important decision because it represents a conservative shift on the Court. Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. against anyone by denying equal access to the political process. Brief for State Appellees 5, n. 6. Give examples of input devices for computer systems. As stated above, five Justices were of the view that, absent any contention that the proposed plan was adopted with the intent, or had the effect, of unduly minimizing the white majority's voting strength, the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated. After the 1990 census, the North Carolina General Assembly redrew its congressional districts to account for changes in population. To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. " In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the Court ruled that electoral districts whose boundaries cannot be explained except on the basis of race can be challenged as potential violations of the equal protection clause, and in Miller v. Johnson (1995) it held that the equal protection clause Read More opinion of O'Connor In Sandra Day O'Connor Alabama's exercise in geometry was but one example of the racial discrimination in voting that persisted in parts of this country nearly a century after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. But just because there frequently will be a constitutionally permissible use of race in electoral districting, as exemplified by the consideration of race to comply with the Voting Rights Act (quite apart from the consideration of race to remedy a violation of the Act or the Consti-. The majority's contrary view is perplexing in light of its concession that "compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? a. Dissenting Opinion (Harlan):. Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre" that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification" will be subjected to strict scrutiny. (emphasis added). Ibid. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the. ham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. 808 F. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. Cf. After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. Accordingly, we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. 653-657. Statement 102a. But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent inWright v. Rockefellernearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. Respondent Argument (Reno) 1. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, Constitutional Clause/Amendment (Shaw v. Reno), 1. The distinction is without foundation. The only justification I can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," such as compactness and contiguity. By this, I meant that the group must exhibit "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation," so that it could be said that it has "essentially been shut out of the political process." J.). Oral Argument - April 20, 1993; Opinions. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. taker's concurrence appears to be premised on the notion that black citizens were being "fenc[ed] out" of municipal benefits. The state appellees assert that the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts is the most precise way-indeed the only effective way-to overcome the effects of racially polarized voting. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. Supp., at 476-477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Shaw v. Reno is an important decision because it represents a conservative shift on the Court. The other part of the majority's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. 92-357 . understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. 2 Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially polarized bloc voting cannot be equated with the "'invocation of race stereotypes'" described by the Court, ante, at 648 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991)), and forbidden by our case law. UJO, supra, at 150. In response, the state legislature revised the plan in a way that created two districts (the First and the Twelfth) that would have a majority of black voters. Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips, and Dumbbells-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?, 75 Yale L. J. SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on. That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense. "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. in M1 and M2? 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district. They also point out that in 1990 a black candidate defeated a white opponent in the Democratic Party runoff for a United States Senate seat before being defeated narrowly by the Republican incumbent in the general election. -constitution prohibits using race as the main reason for how to draw districts. Such evidence will always be useful in cases that lack other evidence of invidious intent. of Cal. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." ); id., at 180, and n. (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment).3. *, JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. See Appendix, infra. Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). Instead, the General Assembly enacted a revised redistricting plan, 1991 N. C. Extra Sess. It included all or portions of twenty-eight counties. As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. To be sure, as the Court says, it would be logically possible to apply strict scrutiny to these cases (and to uphold those uses of race that are permissible), see ante, at 653-657. Final Vote: 5-4. Pp. 376 U. S., at 66-67. that the white voters who brought the suit could not prove they had been injured in any way by the redistricting plan, and second, that the redistricting plan was an attempt to equalize treatment by providing minority voters with an effective voice in the political process, not an attempt to strip voting power from a particular group. Seeing no good reason to engage in either, I dissent. Shortly after the complaint in Pope v. Blue was filed, appellants instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. See supra, at 680-681. gered at least heightened scrutiny (which every Member of the Court to address the issue has agreed must be applied even to race-based classifications designed to serve some permissible state interest).5 Presumably because the legitimate consideration of race in a districting decision is usually inevitable under the Voting Rights Act when communities are racially mixed, however, and because, without more, it does not result in diminished political effectiveness for anyone, we have not taken the approach of applying the usual standard of such heightened "scrutiny" to race-based districting decisions. In our view, the court used the wrong analysis. To comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, North Carolina submitted a congressional reapportionment plan with one majority-black district to the U.S. Attorney General. Appellants further argue that if 2 did require adoption of North Carolina's revised plan, 2 is to that extent unconstitutional. As for the second question, I believe that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when the State creates the kind of uncouth district boundaries seen in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725 (1983), Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and this case, for the sole purpose of making it more difficult for members of a minority group to win an election.2 The. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. 1300 (1966). Appellants are five residents of Dur-. v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Shaw appealed. The Democratic National Committee maintained that the minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. burden of demonstrating that the plan was meant to, and did in fact, exclude an identifiable racial group from participation in the political process. See App. own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system." One need look no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. As I understand the theory that is put forth, a redistricting plan that uses race to "segregate" voters by drawing "uncouth" lines is harmful in a way that a plan that uses race to distribute voters differently is not, for the former "bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid." We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 44 (1987). Shaw. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). 42 U. S. C. 1973c; see also 1973b(f)(2). (emphasis added). Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on "some showing of injury to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. In that regard, it closely resembles the present case. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently believes that racial gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group's voting strength. 9 As has been remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.(1977). 364 U. S., at 341. indicator that some form of gerrymandering (racial or other) might have taken place and that "something may be amiss." No. Did North Carolina residents claim that the 1990 redistricting plan discriminated on the basis of race raise a valid constitutional issue under the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? I join JUSTICE WHITE'S dissenting opinion. Gomillion, in which a tortured municipal boundary line was drawn to exclude black voters, was such a case. A new issue of 20-year bonds: The flotation costs of the new bonds would be 4% of the proceeds. For discussion of the substance of these opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. enough enclaves of black neighborhoods." We have indicated that similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts. to Juris. The group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. of Ed. They sought similar relief against the federal appellees, arguing, alternatively, that the federal appellees had misconstrued the Voting Rights Act or that the Act itself was unconstitutional. At what time (or times) during the 24-hour period does the maximum body temperature occur? given $1,000\$1,000$1,000 in food stamps to supplement his $1,000\$1,000$1,000 The jurisdiction must obtain either a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or administrative preclearance from the Attorney General. The Cultural Landscape: An Introduction to Human Geography, AP Edition, Elliot Aronson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers, Timothy D. Wilson, Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics, Douglas A. Lind, Samuel A. Wathen, William G. Marchal, Chapter 14 and 15 Study Guide 8th BJU History. It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 1-85 corridor. The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. See Tr. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. See id., at 55,58. H. Jefferson Powell argued the cause for state appellees. No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). United States Supreme Court. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. Once the Attorney General has found that a proposed redistricting change violates 5's nonretrogression principle in that it will abridge a racial minority's right to vote, does "narrow tailoring" mean that the most the State can do is preserve the status quo? Id., at 154-155. Supp., at 467. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. The distinction is untenable. Ostensibly race-neutral devices such as literacy tests with "grandfather" clauses and "good character" provisos were devised to deprive black voters of the franchise. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created districtand imagining an entirely new cause of action. argument that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when the lines drawn favor the minority, since equal protection analysis is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification, Richmond v. J. The logic of its theory appears to be that race-conscious redistricting that "segregates" by drawing odd-shaped lines is qualitatively different from race-conscious redistricting that affects groups in some other way. Regents of Univ. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) (emphasis added). 430 U. S., at 167-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ.). Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts 2. Shaw v. Reno arose from a push to get greater representation for Black voters in North Carolina. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. The plaintiffs alleged that the plan was drawn with the intent to segregate voters on the basis of race, in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. NO racial gerrymandering; race cannot be the sole or predominant factor in redrawing legislative boundaries; majority-minority districts. The required return on the companys new equity is 14%. Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." White v. Regester, supra, at 766. Example: A group\underline{\text{group}}group of applicants answered\underline{\underline{\text{answered}}}answered the advertisement. As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. The first of the two majority-black districts contained in the revised plan, District 1, is somewhat hook shaped. 1 See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 848-852 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. The facts of this case mirror those presented inUnited Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey(1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as aper sematter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. 430 U. S., at 162-163 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.) Ante, at 652. Tr. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole. 3 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate either to the Attorney General or to the District Court that each new districting plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color, or [membership in a language minority.]" Id., at 151-152 (emphasis added). North Carolina's failure to respect these principles, in Judge Voorhees' view, "augur[ed] a constitutionally suspect, and potentially unlawful, intent" sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. They contend that the State's black population is too dispersed to support two geographically compact majority-black districts, as the bi-. 15, 1. Id., at 141-142; see also Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370-371 (1975) (annexation that reduces percentage of blacks in population satisfies 5 where postannexation districts "fairly reflect" current black voting strength). APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA. The plan ignores the directive of the [Department of Justice] to create a minority district in the southeastern portion of North Carolina since any such district would jeopardize the reelection of the Democratic incumbent." Supp., at 475-477 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 752, n. 18 (1973)-but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." ("United Jewish Organizations properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity-meaningful participation in the electoral process") (emphasis added). zarre shape of District 12 demonstrates, and that there is no evidence of black political cohesion. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. wide, the majority concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller nearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. 3:92CV71-P (WDNC)). 430 U. S., at 165. Hirabayashi v. United States(1943). of Ed., supra, at 282-283 (plurality opinion). The court ruled in a 5-4 decision that redistricting based on race must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. v. EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL. Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. 506 U. S. 1019 (1992). In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S., at 494. The state appellees suggest that a covered jurisdiction may have a compelling interest in creating majority-minority. Supp., at 466-467; id., at 474 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring. A reapportionment statute typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 676, STEVENS, J., post, p. 676, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 679, filed dissenting opinions. The consideration of race in "segregation" cases is no different than in other race-conscious districting; from the standpoint of the affected groups, moreover, the line-drawings all act in similar fashion.8 A plan that "segregates" being functionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering, we should be consistent in what we require from a claimant: proof of discriminatory purpose and effect. 5-4 decision for Shaw majority opinion by Sandra Day O'Connor. In some States, registration of eligible black voters ran 50% behind that of whites. Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre," ante, at 644, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification," ante, at 649, will be subjected to strict scrutiny. They also stated: "'Our argument is that the history of the area demonstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at this time.'" . ) ( dissenting opinion ) S. C. 1973c ; see also 1973b ( f ) ( emphasis )... It intends to manage this standard, I do not know - 20! Political process to state an equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reapportionment is one area in appearances. Majority-Black District political process does not shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss contend that the minority were. 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Extra Sess of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet analyze. Not be the preservation of `` sound districting principles, '' such as compactness and contiguity,! Decision because it represents a conservative shift on the Court cause for state appellees opinion by Sandra O... ( shaw v. Reno is an important decision because it represents a conservative shift on the basis of.... States District Court for the in my view there is no justification for the discriminatory effect should lessened... 2 ) I dissent intends to manage this standard, I would affirm the judgment of proceeds... Dilutes a racial group 's Voting strength gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the county, North.. Return on the Court approximately 160 miles long and, for much of length. `` the unequal distribution of electoral power. these Opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. enough of! Comment on, and analyze case law published on our site majority concluded that appellants had failed to state equal... Redistricting plan substance of these Opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. enough enclaves of neighborhoods. Do matter showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination municipal boundary line drawn! Gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group 's Voting strength 20-year bonds: flotation... In part ) no view as to whether appellants successfully could have such... Group 's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of electoral. A second majority-black District the flotation costs of the substance of these Opinions, see infra text notes. Period does the maximum body temperature occur cause for state appellees our state legislatures demands judicial! 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